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It is often argued that competition forces managers to make better choices, thus favoring
managerial autonomy in decision making. I formalize and challenge this idea. Suppose
that managers care about keeping their position or avoiding interference, and that they can
make strategic choices that a⁄ect both the expected pro￿ts of the ￿rm and their riskiness.
Even if competition at ￿rst pushes the manager towards pro￿t maximization as commonly
argued, I show that further increases in competitive forces might as well lead him to take
excessive risks if the threat on his position is strong enough. To curb this possibility, the
principal-owner optimally reduces the degree of autonomy granted to the manager. Hence
higher levels of managerial autonomy are more likely for intermediate levels of competition.
JEL Codes: D23, L22, M12, M21
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Most economists would agree that competition is a source of discipline. Competition is
generally believed to reduce the amount of slack a manager can a⁄ord and to have a positive
in￿ uence on managerial e⁄ort.1 Aghion et al. (1999) and Schmidt (1997), in particular, have
emphasized the idea that stronger competition increases the threat of liquidation of the ￿rm,
and that this might induce managers to work harder.
As pointed out by Diamond (1998), ￿managers are called on to make choices as well
as to make e⁄orts￿ , but it is often argued that the same disciplinary e⁄ect of competition
also forces managers to make better choices, or pushes them towards pro￿t maximization.
The consequent prediction is that an increase in competition should favor the delegation of
decision-making authority. Acemoglu et al. (2007), for instance, articulate this argument as
follows:
￿Yet another e⁄ect of a more competitive environment may be through disciplin-
ing the manager; faced with greater competition, managers may be forced to take
pro￿t-maximizing decisions more often, thus reducing the con￿ ict of interest be-
tween the principal and the manager. This would naturally increase delegation,
since delegation becomes more attractive to the principal￿(p. 1797).
Though frequently referred to, the idea that competition induces better choices has been
rarely subjected to formal analysis. In this paper I develop a highly stylized model of
authority within the ￿rm in which the degree of con￿ ict between the parties is a⁄ected by
the strength of competition, and challenge the common presumption that a more competitive
environment always forces managers to make choices in the best interest of the ￿rm, thereby
fostering managerial autonomy in decision making.
In the model considered, a ￿rm is run by a manager who exerts e⁄ort to ￿gure out a
better strategy for the organization and implements it. His strategic choices a⁄ect not only
the expected pro￿ts of the ￿rm, but also their riskiness. The manager has his own goals -
1See Karuna (2007) for recent empirical evidence.
1in particular, to keep his incumbency rents - which need not be perfectly aligned with the
interests of the principal-owner. The principal-owner, on the other hand, can constrain the
manager￿ s autonomy or discretion in decision making through her own monitoring e⁄ort,
and may intervene in the manager￿ s operations if performance is poor. This intervention
may take many forms (e.g., ￿ring the manager, shutting down) and reduces the manager￿ s
rents ￿who will thus try to avoid it.
Under these conditions, I show that an increase in competition can lead to less delega-
tion. Competition a⁄ects the congruence of interests between the manager and the organi-
zation through a reduction in pro￿ts that increases the likelihood of poor performance, and
through the associated threat to the manager￿ s incumbency rents. At ￿rst, a strengthening
of competition induces the manager to make decisions more in line with the interests of the
organization, and therefore leads to increased managerial autonomy ￿as commonly argued.
Further increases in competitive forces, however, might as well lead the manager to take ex-
cessive risks if the threat on his rents is strong enough. To curb this possibility of having the
manager gamble for his resurrection, the principal optimally reduces the degree of autonomy
granted to the manager. With an intermediate level of competition the threat on incum-
bency rents is just enough to align the manager￿ s interests with those of the organization
without pushing him to take value-reducing risks. The paper then predicts a nonmonotonic
relationship between competition and delegation: Higher degrees of managerial autonomy
in decision making are more likely for intermediate levels of competition.
Although there is much informal discussion about how increasing competition is driving
corporate change, empirical evidence on the relationship between competition and delegation
does not abound ￿and is far from conclusive. Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Bloom et al.
(2007) document a positive correlation between competition and delegation. Caroli and van
Reenen (2001), however, ￿nd basically no evidence of a relationship between competition
and organizational change (as characterized by delegation of responsibility and delayering).
Khandwalla (1973) also ￿nds no correlation between delegation and price competition, and
between delegation and overall competition, but documents a positive correlation between
2delegation and product competition (di⁄erentiation).2 Marin and Verdier (2008a), on the
other hand, report evidence fromGermany and Austria that ￿rms are more likely to centralize
decision-making powers when competition strengthens. More indirectly, Nickell et al. (2001)
show that poor performance leads ￿rms to centralize decision making.
The argument that a strengthening of competition induces better managerial choices can
only explain a positive correlation between competition and delegation, but cannot account
for the negative relationship found in several studies. The model envisioned here, by stressing
that at some point more competition leads to worse choices, suggests a possible explanation
for the ￿ndings of those studies: when competition is tough and performance is poor, a
manager concerned with his survival or reputation would tend to take excessive risks if left
unchecked ￿hence the principal intervenes more and grants him less autonomy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a simple model
to analyze the delegation problem within the ￿rm. In Section 3 I look for the optimal
organizational response to changes in the strength of competitive forces facing the ￿rm.
Section 4 concludes.
2 A simple model of the determinants of managerial
autonomy
We begin in this section with a simple model of delegation that emphasizes the organizational
problem faced by a ￿rm. To ￿x ideas, I focus on an organization that produces a good (or
service) to be sold in a (￿nal) product market. To stress the delegation problem, I do not
model market interaction here, but represent its outcome by a reduced-form pro￿t function
￿ (￿); where ￿ is a known competition parameter, like the number of competitors in the
product market (see more below).
The ￿rm I consider is a simple hierarchy composed of a principal (￿ she￿ ) and an agent
2This work underlines the importance of clarifying the type of competition ￿rms are facing when analyzing
the e⁄ect of competition on delegation practices. See Ruzzier (2008) for a modeling e⁄ort in this direction.
3(the manager; ￿ he￿ ). The manager is in charge of running the ￿rm.3 Managing the ￿rm
involves ￿￿guring out what to do￿and ￿doing it￿(Radner, 1992); that is, the managerial
task comprises two di⁄erent activities: planning and implementation. Planning refers to the
acquisition of information; implementation refers to its use (Demski and Sappington, 1987).
Concerning information, I will assume that the manager has speci￿c knowledge ￿that in
practice is too costly to communicate to others in the ￿rm [...] and is often the reason why
managers are entrusted with decisions in the ￿rst place￿(Raith, 2008).4 To be concrete, we
will think of this speci￿c knowledge as concerning the routine way of running the ￿rm, and
stemming from the manager￿ s being in charge of day-to-day management of the company. I
place all the routine actions of the manager under the header ￿ status quo￿￿speci￿c knowledge
implies that the manager can always resort to the status quo even if he exerts no further
planning e⁄ort. In other words the planning task is only important for nonroutine activities.5
To keep things simple, there are three possible pro￿t levels, ￿H (￿) > ￿M (￿) > ￿L (￿),











where E [￿] is the expectation operator, and the subindex sq stands for ￿ status quo￿ . At least
three pro￿t levels are necessary for strategies to be noncomparable in terms of ￿rst-order
stochastic dominance, so as to be able to consider risk-taking behavior within the model
(see, for instance, Lambert, 1986). In what follows, I omit the dependence of ￿ on ￿ when
there is no risk of confusion.
The principal is unaware of the status quo, but she may learn about it through her mon-
itoring e⁄ort, as I explain below. These assumptions are meant to capture the idea that the
principal is somewhat removed from day-to-day management and that managers are often
3I refer to a ￿rm for the sake of concreteness, but the analysis can also be applied to a division, a
subsidiary, or generally, to any independent pro￿t center.
4Colombo and Delmastro (2004) show evidence that the information advantage of the manager is actually
a key determinant of delegation.
5The idea of the status quo has some parallel with Demski and Sappington￿ s (1987) null information
structure, which is costless for the manager to access.
4much better informed about current operations than their superiors. Several examples come
to mind: shareholders/CEO (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, argue that managers normally get
the residual control rights when they have more expertise than shareholders and contracts are
incomplete, and that this may lead to poor choices from the point of view of the sharehold-
ers), CEO/division manager (Jennergren, 1981, for instance, claims that ￿in a divisionally
decentralized ￿rm, divisions are largely independent in day-to-day operations￿ ), headquar-
ters/local o¢ ce (Newman and Novoselov, 2005, consider such an organizational structure to
be descriptive of ￿rms whose local o¢ ces, especially in remote locations, enjoy considerable
autonomy and discretion over decisions), production manager/plant manager, or any other
situation in which the principal is, to some extent, not privy to day-to-day operations of the
￿rm.
Strategies. Through his planning e⁄ort the manager can ￿gure out changes to the
way things are done. These changes will be summarized in what I will call a ￿ strategy￿ :
a set of actions that, if implemented, lead to a new probability distribution on pro￿ts.
￿ Strategy￿should be interpreted in a broad sense, to include actions that a⁄ect not only the
expected value of the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts, but also their riskiness. The manager￿ s control over the
idiosyncratic risks of the ￿rm may come under many guises: expanding production capacity
or relocating production plants, doing more or less preventive maintenance of the productive
equipment, outsourcing activities or carrying them out in-house, adopting a hard or a soft
stance at wage negotiations, diversifying into other business lines or concentrating on core
activities. All these actions di⁄er in their observability. I focus here on the kind of controls
over risk that are di¢ cult to observe, and simplify things by assuming there are di⁄erent
strategies available to the manager, which modify the risk-return characteristics of the ￿rm￿ s
operations in a way summarized by the induced probability distributions.
The ￿rm faces n ￿ 3 ex ante identical strategies that could be potentially implemented,
but strategies cannot be described in advance and put into an enforceable contract, as in
Aghion and Tirole (1997). I will further assume that there are just two strategies worth
5selecting: the ￿rst I call ￿ aggressive￿ ; the other, ￿ conservative￿ . Every other strategy yields a
disastrous (i.e., su¢ ciently negative) payo⁄ to both parties.
Being aggressive amounts to choosing a riskier strategy, whereby the probability of high
pro￿ts is increased by ￿ and that of low pro￿ts by ￿; and the probability of an intermediate
level of pro￿ts is reduced by ￿+￿: Adopting an aggressive strategy reduces expected pro￿ts,
namely
Eag [￿] < Esq [￿] () ￿(￿) ￿ (￿ + ￿)￿M ￿ (￿￿H + ￿￿L) > 0: (1)
In other words, I assume that taking risk results in a probability distribution that is second-
order stochastically dominated by the status quo. The idea that risk taking reduces values
is common in the analysis of risk-shifting problems and is consistent with empirical evidence
on the matter (see Biais and Casamatta, 1999, and the references therein).
On the other hand, if the manager chooses the conservative strategy, the probability of
high pro￿ts is decreased by ￿ and that of low pro￿ts by ￿; and the probability of a medium
level of pro￿ts is increased by ￿+￿: Notice that the condition (1) implies also that expected
pro￿ts are highest under the conservative strategy, i.e., Eco [￿] > Esq [￿] > Eag [￿]; and that
￿(￿) = Eco [￿] ￿ Esq [￿]
= Esq [￿] ￿ Eag [￿]:
Planning. Ex ante, all the strategies look alike. Planning allows the manager to tell
them apart. At date 1 the manager exerts noncontractible planning e⁄ort to ￿nd out available
strategies and associated payo⁄s. If the manager exerts e⁄ort level e; at personal cost  m (e)
he is perfectly able to discern strategies with probability e. With probability 1 ￿ e; he
remains uninformed.6 E⁄ort can be thought of as time and resources devoted to gathering
and processing information ￿for example, the manager may seek the advice of consultants
or may investigate how things are done in other ￿rms in the industry.
Also at date 1 the principal can constrain the manager through monitoring of his activi-
ties. To this end, she simultaneously chooses noncontractible monitoring (or control) e⁄ort
6The information acquisition technology is familiar from Aghion and Tirole (1997).
6c: with probability c; she is informed about the possible strategies, including the status quo.
This e⁄ort is costly to the principal: her cost-of-e⁄ort function is  p (c). For j = m;p;
I assume that  j is increasing and strictly convex, and satis￿es  j (0) =  
0
j (0) = 0, and
 
0
j (1) = +1:
The principal￿ s monitoring e⁄ort can be interpreted as the time and resources devoted to
establishing a management control system (MCS), for it is her way of trying to ensure that
the manager will do what is best for the organization. Having  
0
p (1) = +1 just re￿ ects
that perfect control is rarely cost-e⁄ective (Merchant, 1998).
Planning, if successful, generates a set of possible strategies from which the manager must
choose at the implementation stage. Contrary to planning, implementation is costless; for
instance, all strategies may require roughly the same level of implementation e⁄ort (normal-
ized to zero) from the manager.7 Which strategy is implemented depends on the authority
relationship, as well as on the preferences of both parties.
Implementation. The organization must implement one and only one strategy (maybe
the status quo). Given that I treat the ￿rm as an ongoing business, implementing no strategy
is not an option. That is, the status quo is not the outcome of inaction.8
Managerial e⁄ort generates a set of alternatives to the status quo, and the manager is
then free to (costlessly) choose any element of the set at date 2, unless otherwise directed
by an informed principal (see below). Since the manager already knows the status quo,
he can stick to it if nothing new obtains from his e⁄ort in information gathering; i.e., the
manager can always carry on the business as usual if he cannot devise new strategies. The
disastrous-payo⁄ assumption guarantees that an uninformed manager will always stick to
the status quo (if that choice is his to make).
Strategy choice is observable only to an informed party, but it is unveri￿able. This
7I adopt this formulation to emphasize the planning activity. See Demski and Sappington (1987), Diamond
(1998), and Sung (1995) for similar assumptions.
8Newman and Novoselov (2005) adopt a similar approach. This is contrary to Aghion and Tirole￿ s (1997)
assumption that the organization can always decide to do nothing and realize a zero payo⁄ for both parties.
7means that strategy selection cannot be made part of a contract, and that an uninformed
principal will, out of necessity, delegate this choice to the manager (who, at the very least, is
informed about the status quo and can thus avoid very negative outcomes). If the principal
is uninformed, ordering the manager to maintain the status quo is meaningless, since an
uninformed principal cannot tell whether the status quo stands just by looking at what
the manager is doing. Given that something has to be done, picking at random when
uninformed might result in a disastrous alternative being implemented. The principal might
then rubberstamp a suboptimal strategy choice when uninformed by fear of picking a worse
alternative.
The only way for the principal to be able to e⁄ectively direct the manager￿ s actions is
by being herself informed of strategies. That is, authority has to be enforced. What I have
in mind is that, although endowed with decision or control rights, the principal only has
e⁄ective control or real authority when she has enough incentives to exercise those rights.
Else, she can decide to grant autonomy in decision making to the manager. In the event
that both parties are informed the principal prevails since she has formal authority.9
As my main interest is in managerial autonomy (i.e., the extent of real authority enjoyed
by managers), I do not analyze the possibility of giving the manager formal authority over
decisions. The transfer of formal authority looks very much like splitting up the ￿rm, which
is not a main concern in this study. Furthermore, it can be shown that in this setup full
delegation of formal authority is actually dominated. Matter-of-factly, the principal normally
keeps the right to overrule the manager, as she can always ￿re him.
One can also regard the assumptions about the exercise of authority as picturing an in-
termediate allocation of formal authority. Authority is delegated to the subordinate, but the
superior can reestablish her authority at a cost ￿the cost of monitoring the subordinate.10
9Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also present this idea that there is a cost of exercising a control right. In Hart
and Moore (2005), owners have all decision rights (formal authority), but lack the time to exercise them all
and hence must delegate some to managers (real authority). As they have put it, ￿a senior individual has
formal authority while a junior individual has real authority if he has an idea and his boss does not￿ .
10Aghion and Tirole (1997) discuss such an allocation, but authority is reestablished by an ex post per-
8Think of the manager as receiving broad pro￿t responsibilities, and think of the princi-
pal as being the dispersed stockholders (or the board of directors): they can monitor and
give instructions to the manager, but only if they organize themselves and collect relevant
information, which is costly.11
Pro￿ts and competition. At date 3, pro￿ts are realized according to the probabil-
ity distribution induced by the implemented strategy. I represent the outcome of market
interaction by the following reduced-form gross pro￿t function, which implicitly assumes a
unique equilibrium in the ensuing market game:12
￿ = ￿ (￿): (2)




that measures the strength of
competition (e.g., ￿ could be the number of competitors in the product market, the degree of
substitutability between products, a measure of barriers to entry, and so on), and is known
to both parties at the outset. I make the natural assumption that competition destroys
pro￿ts, that is,
￿ > ￿
0 =) ￿ (￿) < ￿ (￿
0) 8 ￿ 2 f￿H;￿M;￿Lg: (3)
For my purposes, how (2) is derived does not matter. To show that the analysis is
not vacuous, however, I present several alternative derivations of ￿ (￿) from explicit market
games in Appendix B.
Preferences. The principal is risk-neutral and her utility is given by expected pro￿ts
Ek [￿ (￿)]. Expectations are taken over the probability distribution induced by the chosen
strategy: status quo, aggressive, conservative (i.e., k = sq;ag;co). The manager, on the
other hand, does not respond to monetary incentives (for instance, because he is in￿nitely
averse to income risk) and thus receives a constant wage normalized to zero. This extreme
formance evaluation in their paper. See also Hart and Holmstr￿m (2008).
11See Burkart et al. (1997), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for related ideas.
12See Hermalin (1992) and Schmidt (1997) for a similar approach.
9assumption is typical in models that study optimal delegation decisions (Aghion and Tirole,
1997; Burkart et al., 1997; De Bijl, 1994; and Dessein, 2002). It simpli￿es the analysis
and allows me to stress the role of incumbency rents, as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1995).
Equivalently, if pro￿ts are noncontractible and the agent is protected by limited liability, a
constant wage also results.13
The manager also receives private bene￿ts B from job tenure. These may take many
forms, like perquisites on the job, prestige and power associated with the position, acquisition
of human capital and work experience, job satisfaction, or career concerns. The existence
and magnitude of these bene￿ts have been extensively documented (see Zingales, 1995, and
the references cited therein).
Intervention. After pro￿ts are realized and observed by the parties, at date 4 the
principal decides whether to intervene or not in the manager￿ s operations. Intervention
may take many forms (such as the ￿ring of the manager, the liquidation or shut down of
his pro￿t center); the general feature is that intervention reduces the manager￿ s private
bene￿ts or incumbency rents. For the sake of brevity, I will not model the particulars of
this intervention ￿I just assume it is automatically triggered if realized pro￿ts fall below a
certain threshold or target, a situation I will label ￿ poor performance￿ .
Even though I treat the intervention decision as exogenous here, it can be endogenized
as I show in Appendix A. There, I present a two-period version of the model in which
this intervention takes the form of a ￿ring decision that results from the ￿rm￿ s optimizing
behavior. Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), Warner et al.
(1988), and Weisbach (1988) actually ￿nd evidence that poor performance (measured by
stock performance or changes in earnings) contributes to non-routine CEO turnover.
13As is common in this kind of models, all the qualitative results go through if the manager responds to
monetary incentives, as long as he cares enough about his private bene￿ts. The proof is available from the
author upon request. Burkart et al. (1997) discuss how both monetary incentives and private bene￿ts can
coexist in an optimal arrangement, and show that performance pay normally does not render monitoring
redundant.
10To capture that poor performance has costs for managers, I assume that intervention
implies a utility loss L for the manager; i.e., his rents are reduced from B to B ￿ L.14 The
utility loss L can be caused by career concerns considerations (e.g., the market interpreting
poor performance as a signal of bad quality) or arise from actions that the manager must
take in case of intervention and that he does not like (as downsizing). If poor performance
triggers the removal of the manager, L could represent ￿possible losses in income and ￿rm-
speci￿c human capital, and in any power, prestige, and other non-pecuniary bene￿ts [the
manager] derived from managing￿the ￿rm (Gilson, 1989). Even if there is no turnover, the
manager may su⁄er from reductions in his compensation or decision-making authority.15
Let ￿I be the pro￿t threshold that triggers intervention. Realized pro￿ts ￿ (￿) can fall
short of ￿I ￿assumption (3) implies that stronger competition makes this event more likely.
To make this notion more precise, assume that there exists a ￿ such that ￿L (￿) = ￿I:
This implies that for every ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ [0;￿]; we have ￿H > ￿M > ￿L ￿ ￿I: Analogously,

















; we know ￿H ￿ ￿I > ￿M > ￿L: It is clear that
￿ < b ￿ < ￿; and that ￿; b ￿; and ￿ form a partition of ￿:
To sum up,
￿H (￿) ￿M (￿) ￿L (￿)
￿ 2 ￿ > ￿I > ￿I ￿ ￿I
￿ 2 b ￿ > ￿I ￿ ￿I < ￿I
￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿I < ￿I < ￿I
(4)
In what follows, we will say that competition is weak whenever ￿ 2 ￿. Similarly, intermediate
competition will make reference to cases where ￿ 2 b ￿, and when ￿ 2 ￿ we will speak of
intense competition.
It is clear that poor performance jeopardizes the manager￿ s rents. The direct consequence
14Gilson (1989, 1990), for example, presents evidence on managers￿personal costs from ￿nancial distress. I
assume that distress does not imply a utility loss for the principal. Schmidt (1997) makes similar assumptions.
15He might even face losses in terms of reduced self-esteem. Even though extreme as an example, Gilson
(1989) has a case of suicide among his sample of managers in ￿nancially-distressed ￿rms.
11of my assumptions is that all the manager cares about is avoiding such a situation, like the
conservative managers in Hart (1983), Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), or Aghion et al. (1999).
The likelihood of intervention will depend, of course, on the probability distribution of
pro￿ts that results from the planning and implementation activities, but also on the strength
of competition. Let us call this likelihood dk (￿): We can easily compute it from table (4). To
simplify notation, let dk (￿) ￿ d
k; k = co;sq;ag; denote the probability that realized pro￿ts
fall short of the threshold when competition is weak and the manager implements strategy
k. All other probabilities in the table below are de￿ned accordingly. Then:
conservative status quo aggressive
￿ 2 ￿ d
co = 0 d
sq = 0 d
ag = 0
￿ 2 b ￿ b dco = 1
3 ￿ ￿ b dsq = 1
3
b dag = 1
3 + ￿
￿ 2 ￿ d
co
= 2








For instance, if competition is intermediate and the organization implements the conser-
vative strategy, the probability of intervention in this case (b dco) is equal to the probability of
￿L; i.e., 1
3 ￿￿: Quite naturally, stronger competition increases the likelihood of an interven-
tion from the principal.16 Indeed, DeFond and Park (1999) present evidence showing that
the probability of CEO turnover increases with higher levels of competition (proxied by the
Her￿ndahl index).
3 Optimal degree of autonomy granted to the manager
In this section, I look for the optimal organizational response to changes in the ￿rm￿ s en-
vironment ￿that is, I discuss the optimal choices of planning and monitoring e⁄orts as a
function of the strength of competitive forces.
Condition (1) implies that the principal would always prefer to implement a conserva-
tive strategy, regardless of the level of competition. The manager￿ s preferred strategy, on
16I have assumed that the probability of poor performance is zero when competition is weak. This is no
more than a simplifying assumption, the essential feature being that the probability of poor performance is
higher for a low-pro￿t ￿rm than for a high-pro￿t one.
12the other hand, is the one that minimizes the likelihood of poor performance, and thus it
changes with ￿: Simple inspection of table (5) shows that the manager is indi⁄erent between
strategies when competition is weak, strictly prefers being conservative when competition is
intermediate, and strictly prefers taking risk when competition is intense. This is the basic
con￿ ict of interests between principal and manager. It does not arise from di⁄erent risk
preferences (as in, e.g., Lambert, 1986), but from di⁄erent goals ￿maximization of expected
pro￿ts vs. minimization of the likelihood of intervention.
The case of weak competition (￿ 2 ￿) is straightforward to examine: since the manager
can never fail the pro￿t target when competition is weak, the principal cannot expect him to
exert any costly e⁄ort to ￿nd ways to do things better for the organization ￿the manager just
puts in minimal e⁄ort (i.e., his optimal choice is e = 0).17 The principal has, nevertheless, an
incentive to get herself involved in daily operations and exert some e⁄ort in order to be able
to instruct the manager to implement the conservative strategy rather than the status quo.
If she exerts e⁄ort c; her preferred strategy is implemented with probability c; otherwise the
manager just sticks to the routine.
Let ￿k (￿) ￿ Ek [￿ (￿)]; k = sq;ag;co: The objective function of the principal in the case
￿ 2 ￿ can be written as
up = c ￿ ￿
co (￿) + (1 ￿ c) ￿ ￿
sq (￿) ￿  p (m):
The principal chooses the monitoring e⁄ort that maximizes this expression ￿call it c. It
satis￿es the following ￿rst-order condition:
￿(￿) =  
0
p (c):
Since ￿(￿) > 0 by (1),  
0
p (0) = 0 and  
00
p > 0; we have c > 0: The principal just puts
e⁄ort up to the point where the marginal bene￿t given by the increase in expected pro￿ts if
informed, ￿, equals the marginal cost of monitoring.
17Strong competition in the market for corporate control may place a lower bound on managerial e⁄ort.
As this falls out of the scope of this paper, I just treat e = 0 as a normalization for some minimum level of
e⁄ort.
13When competition is intermediate (￿ 2 b ￿); the manager￿ s position is no longer secure:
there is a chance that performance is poor, an event in which intervention will occur and he
will bear the utility loss L. Competition then provides a wedge between the manager￿ s utility
in case of e⁄ort and no e⁄ort, and thus provides him with incentives to work harder and
show more initiative, much as in a typical moral hazard problem. The manager maximizes
b um = c
h￿
1 ￿ b d
co
￿
￿ B + b d
co ￿ (B ￿ L)
i
+(1 ￿ c) ￿ e ￿
h￿
1 ￿ b d
co
￿
￿ B + b d
co ￿ (B ￿ L)
i
+(1 ￿ c) ￿ (1 ￿ e) ￿
h￿
1 ￿ b d
sq
￿
￿ B + b d
sq ￿ (B ￿ L)
i
￿  m (e):
To understand this expression, notice that with probability c the principal is informed
and imposes her preferred conservative strategy, and intervention occurs with probability b dco:
With probability 1 ￿ c the principal is uninformed and the manager is granted autonomy
in strategy selection: if he is informed, the manager chooses his preferred strategy, which
in this case coincides with the principal￿ s; if he remains uninformed, he sticks to the status
quo. Rearranging, we arrive at
b um = B ￿
n
[c + (1 ￿ c) ￿ e] ￿ b d
co + (1 ￿ c) ￿ (1 ￿ e) ￿ b d
sq
o
￿ L ￿  m (e):
The objective function of the principal becomes
b up = c ￿ ￿
co (￿) + (1 ￿ c) ￿ e ￿ ￿
co (￿) + (1 ￿ c) ￿ (1 ￿ e) ￿ ￿
sq (￿) ￿  p (c);
or
b up = [c + (1 ￿ c) ￿ e] ￿ ￿
co + (1 ￿ c) ￿ (1 ￿ e) ￿ ￿
sq ￿  p (c):
Let b c and b e denote the optimal choices of e⁄orts. A Nash equilibrium is given by the
solution to the following system of ￿rst-order conditions:18
(1 ￿ b e) ￿ ￿(￿) =  
0
p (b c) (6)
(1 ￿ b c) ￿ ￿ ￿ L =  
0
m (b e):





14We see immediately that b e > e = 0: By increasing his planning e⁄ort, the manager is
more likely to implement his preferred strategy when the principal is uninformed, which
happens with probability (1 ￿ b c), thus reducing the probability of intervention by ￿ and
saving ￿L in expectation. Since the principal￿ s reaction function (6) is downward sloping,
we can infer that b c < c: E⁄ort only bene￿ts the principal (she gains ￿(￿) in expected pro￿ts)
if the manager is uninformed (which happens with probability 1 ￿ b e), since if the manager
is informed he nevertheless implements the principal￿ s preferred strategy. I record these
￿ndings as Result 1:
Result 1 When moving from weak competition to intermediate, product market competition
fosters autonomy and initiative.
When competition is intermediate, an informed manager chooses strategies in line with
the interests of the principal. The goals of both parties are aligned, and hence the principal
need not monitor as much as in the previous situation, but can rely more on her manager ￿
managerial autonomy (measured as 1￿c) thus increases. Likewise, the manager knows that
his principal will intervene less and hence is more willing to show initiative and go about
new ways of doing things. Competition here leads to employee empowerment and makes
the company more entrepreneurial and innovative. Result 1 provides support for the idea
that increased competition reduces the con￿ ict of interest between principal and manager,
because it induces the manager to make better decisions. I will argue shortly that things
may be di⁄erent if competition increases even further.
When competition is intense (￿ 2 ￿) the manager￿ s objective function becomes




+ (1 ￿ c) ￿ e ￿ d
ag
+ (1 ￿ c) ￿ (1 ￿ e) ￿ d
sqo
￿ L ￿  m (e):
As before, an informed principal will instruct the manager to implement the conservative
strategy. If, on the other hand, the manager is granted autonomy in decision making, he will
choose the aggressive strategy if informed (since it is the one that minimizes the likelihood
of intervention in this case) or stick to the status quo if uninformed.
15The principal chooses c to maximize
up = c ￿ ￿
co (￿) + (1 ￿ c) ￿ e ￿ ￿
ag (￿) + (1 ￿ c) ￿ (1 ￿ e) ￿ ￿
sq (￿) ￿  p (c):
Let c and e denote the optimal choices of e⁄orts. A Nash equilibrium is found by solving
the following ￿rst-order conditions:19
(1 + e) ￿ ￿(￿) =  
0
p (c) (7)
(1 ￿ c) ￿ ￿ ￿ L =  
0
m (e):
We see immediately that both e and c are strictly positive.
When times are bad (competition is tough, pro￿ts are low), the nature of the relationship
between principal and manager itself changes: the principal￿ s reaction function (7) becomes
upward sloping. The principal wants to minimize the likelihood of her manager being in-
formed when she herself is uninformed, to prevent him from implementing a bad strategy.
She achieves this by increasing control and granting less autonomy ￿thus, c > b c. This incen-
tive is all the more powerful the higher the manager￿ s own e⁄ort; hence the upward slope.
The principal develops a tendency to step in during bad times, since she can no longer a⁄ord
letting the manager take the wrong actions (from the organization￿ s perspective). In fact,
she monitors even more than when competition was weak, since now she has to compensate
for the e⁄ort of the manager ￿that is, c > c.
For the manager the basic trade-o⁄ remains the same, since the closer the principal
monitors him, the more likely it is that he will be overruled, and the less it pays to him
to exert costly e⁄ort (his reaction function is downward sloping). We see immediately that
e > e: Whether the manager exerts more or less e⁄ort than in the case of intermediate
competition depends on the relative values of ￿ and ￿: For instance, if his actions have a
much larger impact on the probability of high pro￿ts, the manager exerts more e⁄ort when
competition is intense than when it is intermediate, because implementing the aggressive
strategy has a high payo⁄ when ￿ is relatively large.
19The stability condition is automatically satis￿ed.
16Result 2 restates the conclusion about the impact of a further increase in competition on
managerial autonomy.
Result 2 When competition strengthens further from intermediate to intense, product mar-
ket competition leads to less autonomy.
The prediction that increased competition leads to less autonomy when competition is
intense ￿ts well with the empirical evidence reported in Nickell et al. (2001) that when ￿rms
are doing badly, centralization of decision-making is favored. Consistent with the argument
that competition induces better choices and more delegation, the authors reason that ￿bad
times mean a higher probability of bankruptcy and an increased threat to jobs. Almost
inevitably the response of both managers and employees will be to try and lower this threat
by reducing the chances of the ￿rm going bankrupt￿(pp. 5-6). They thus expect to ￿nd
support for the hypothesis that prior worsening performance favors decentralization, but ￿nd
exactly the opposite.
The result that autonomy decreases at high levels of competition is also consistent with
the case study reported in Dill (1958). This paper presents a comparative study of environ-
mental in￿ uences on the top-management groups of two Norwegian ￿rms. After recording
sharp di⁄erences in the degree of autonomy of ￿rst-rank managers with respect to their
common superior (the owner-manager) in both ￿rms, the author contrasts the environments
in which the two groups operated, and notes that, in the two ￿rms under analysis, ￿auton-
omy seemed to decrease whenever environmental inputs￿(i.e., ￿), ￿were perceived as signs
of impending con￿ ict￿(p. 438). A more important ￿nding (to our purpose) is that, even
though both ￿rms were facing increased competition in their product markets, the ￿rm with
the lowest degree of autonomy granted to top management was the worst performer and
belonged to the industry that was closest to ￿a period of zero pro￿ts, empty prospects for
new business, and intense competition￿(p. 431).
Yet another illustration of this last prediction is given by the example of Tandem Com-
puters, Inc.20 Tandem￿ s monopoly of fault-tolerant computers was questioned by rivals in
20All the details of the Tandem case below come from http://www.answers.com/topic/tandem-1?cat=biz-
17the 1980s. At the same time the U.S. economy was in recession, and Tandem begun ex-
periencing shrinking sales. In 1982, ￿overly aggressive sales practices￿ 21 were discovered by
management ￿practices that led to a sales ￿gures revision, and to charges of fraud after
an investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission. This kind of practices was
countered through centralization of decision making in top management in order to improve
control (Merchant, 1998, p.12). As we have stressed, bad times tilt the balance towards
tighter control from the principal. In the case of Tandem, James Treybig, the president
at the time, began issuing orders, created an audit team, added a layer of management to
centralize the control of manufacturing and marketing, and implemented other actions that
can be collectively interpreted as a more conservative strategy ￿like cutting back on over-
head and research spending, and moving the company into new lines of business, trying to
broaden the ￿rm￿ s base.
To sum up, let us recall the optimal choice of monitoring e⁄ort (and hence the optimal
level of autonomy granted to the manager) as a function of the strength of competition:
c(￿) =
8
> > > <




if ￿ 2 ￿
if ￿ 2 b ￿
if ￿ 2 ￿
We have seen that
c ￿ c ￿ b c:
The following proposition records the main ￿nding of this paper:
Proposition 1 Higher degrees of managerial autonomy in decision making are more likely
for intermediate levels of product-market competition.
Notice that the reasons that induce the principal to grant little autonomy to her manager
are quite di⁄erent depending on whether competition is weak or intense. In the ￿rst case,
￿n, where the original sources can be found.
21For example, some shipments had been recorded that were not actually completed until after midnight
of the last day of the year.
18there is no loss of managerial initiative from retaining control, as the manager cannot be
induced to exert e⁄ort in any case. Hence the degree of control chosen by the principal
hinges only on the pro￿t gains to be had from choosing a better way of doing things. In
a situation of intense competition, granting autonomy to the manager is costly because his
interests become so antinomic in this case. Trusting the manager with limited autonomy
reduces his initiative, but when competition is intense, the cost of the control loss takes the
ascendancy over that of reduced planning e⁄ort. With an intermediate level of competition
the threat of a potential intervention is just enough to align the interests of the manager
with those of the organization without pushing him to take value-reducing risks.
Simple comparative statics show that autonomy (1 ￿ c) is decreasing in ￿; i.e., the
principal centralizes decision making more when the stakes are higher. Autonomy does not
depend on L when competition is weak, but is positively (negatively) related to the manager￿ s
utility loss when competition is intermediate (intense). The reason is simple. A larger L
gives an increased incentive to the manager￿ s planning e⁄ort. When his interests are aligned
with those of the organization, the principal grants more autonomy; when interests are in
con￿ ict, more control is the optimal organizational response.
Similarly, larger ￿ or ￿ may imply larger expected private bene￿ts for the manager. When
competition is intense, a larger ￿ has two opposite e⁄ects: on the one hand, it decreases the
principal￿ s expected pro￿t gain ￿, and hence her monitoring e⁄ort (check condition [1]); on
the other hand, an increase in ￿ implies larger expected private bene￿ts for the manager,
and thus increased planning e⁄ort on his side. This, in turn, provides incentives for lower
autonomy given the upward slope of the principal￿ s reaction function. With ￿ the second
e⁄ect is no longer present, and the ￿rst e⁄ect reverses sign: an increase in ￿ increases the
principal￿ s stake. Therefore, a larger ￿ points unambiguously in the direction of reduced
autonomy for the manager.
When competition is intermediate, a larger ￿ increases both the principal￿ s and the
manager￿ s expected gains, and the e⁄ect of an increase in ￿ on autonomy cannot be signed
a priori. The manager￿ s expected utility loss is not a⁄ected by ￿ when competition is
19intermediate, but the principal￿ s expected pro￿ts depend negatively on this parameter. An
increased ￿ then leads to an unambiguous increase in the degree of autonomy granted to the
manager in this case.
Finally, the degree of autonomy granted to the manager depends also on the level of com-
petition within each interval of ￿: Notice that, in all cases, sign(@c=@￿) = sign(@￿=@￿);
and that this sign is ambiguous. In Appendix B, I provide two examples where an unam-
biguous prediction obtains.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have built a model where changes in product-market competition a⁄ect the
degree of decision-making autonomy granted to rent-seeking managers within the ￿rm. An
argument that comes up repeatedly in the literature is that competition, by posing a more
severe threat to the survival of the ￿rm, would lead to more congruent decision making by
managers and hence to more delegation. The main contribution of this paper is to challenge
this view by demonstrating that the threat posed by competition can also lead to reduced
congruence of interests.
A basic insight of the delegation literature is that delegation increases with congruence
among the objectives of the parties; that is, more congruence leads to more autonomy for the
manager.22 By making congruence endogenous, I have been able to show that the relationship
between the strength of competitive forces and congruence need not be monotonic, even
if there is a monotonic relationship between congruence and delegation. At low levels of
competition, an increase in competitive forces may increase congruence and thus lead to
more autonomy: because the manager faces costs from poor performance, which becomes
more likely, he might take decisions more in line with the interests of the ￿rm. At higher
levels of competition, a further increase in competition may decrease congruence (and hence
autonomy) if the manager is led to gamble to avoid bad performance and the concomitant
22See, for instance, Aghion and Tirole (1997).
20loss of private bene￿ts ￿when the likelihood of intervention is high, the manager has little
else to lose by choosing such a behavior.23 Therefore, I have concluded that higher degrees of
manager autonomy in decision making were more likely for intermediate levels of competition.
Grossman and Helpman (2002) and Marin and Verdier (2008a,b) come to similar conclu-
sions in di⁄erent setups. In Grossman and Helpman (2002) the decision to delegate or not
(i.e., to outsource or integrate) strikes a balance between the extra governance costs implied
by a vertically integrated structure and the transaction costs associated with searching for
a business partner and dealing with incomplete contracts. If one identi￿es outsourcing with
an extreme type of delegation of formal authority to the manager, the authors show that
there are cases where outsourcing can emerge in equilibrium only for intermediate values
of competition. Marin and Verdier (2008a,b) develop a theory in which the ￿rm responds
to changes in its market environment through changes in the allocation of formal decision-
making power within the ￿rm. They show that, as competition strengthens, the con￿ ict of
interests between the principal and the agent worsens, leading the principal to intervene more
in decision making because the cost of the loss of control is larger. Increased monitoring,
however, reduces the initiative of the agent, and when competition is intermediate it might
be in the interest of the principal to delegate formal authority to the agent to preserve the
agent￿ s initiative, rather than keeping control and extracting only minimum e⁄ort from him.
De Bijl (1995) also looks at the connection between competition and delegation, although
he emphasizes how the extent of an agent￿ s real authority can be chosen strategically to
in￿ uence the market strategy and actions of the ￿rm. In a recent paper, Alonso et al. (2008)
link organizational design to market demand, and discuss how demand conditions a⁄ect the
decision to centralize or decentralize price setting in a ￿rm that sells a single product in
two markets. Chang and Harrington (2003) develop a computational model of competing
multiunit ￿rms, and show that centralization outperforms decentralization when competition
is intense and consumers search and compare stores, because competition magni￿es the early
23As Merchant (1998) noticed, in this case ￿controls are necessary to guard against the possibilities that
people will do something the organization does not want them to do or fail to do something they should￿ .
21organizational learning advantage of centralization.
Schmidt (1997) and Aghion et al. (1999) also work on the idea that increased competition
increases the likelihood of liquidation, and that this might induce the agent to work harder.
When the agent￿ s actions improve cash ￿ ows in the sense of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance
(FOSD), these authors show that this e⁄ort is normally valuable for the principal. As we
have discussed here, the argument does not necessarily carry over to the case of actions whose
e⁄ect on cash ￿ ows cannot be ranked according to FOSD. More generally, I have looked at
the impact of competition on the trade-o⁄ between loss of control and better information
under delegation. Recent models that emphasize this trade-o⁄include De Bijl (1994), Aghion
and Tirole (1997), Baker et al. (1999), and Dessein (2002).
The model I have introduced is highly stylized and involves several admittedly ad hoc
assumptions. Condition (1), in particular, deserves further comment, as it is crucial for the
results. This assumption of second-order stochastic dominance implies that there is no trade-
o⁄ between risk and return (more risk implies ever lower returns), and may seem extreme,
but the essential feature it tries to capture is that at some point risk becomes excessive (in
the sense of destroying pro￿ts), not that risk is always bad. All that is needed for the main
insight to go through is that there exist some strategy which involves excessive risk, and
which is tempting for the manager to pick when facing a large enough threat on his position.
It seems natural to assume that to achieve very high probabilities of a high pro￿t, some
expected return will have to be given up. For instance, assume that there were a continuum
of projects, indexed by their probability g of achieving an intermediate level of pro￿ts, and
that the probability of high pro￿ts is given by a decreasing and concave function h(g):
Expected pro￿ts turn out to be concave in g. For high levels of g; increasing expected pro￿ts
requires accepting higher risks and hence a higher probability of a high state of nature (that
is, reducing g). On the other hand, there is a maximum attainable expected return, and
in order to obtain still higher probabilities of the high state (i.e., reduce g even further),
the ￿rm needs to accept a reduced expected pro￿t. With intense competition the manager
would chose to go beyond the level of g that maximizes expected pro￿t.
22I have chosen particularly extreme assumptions for the parties preferences in order to
stress the role of incumbency rents. The manager cannot be motivated and just cares about
private bene￿ts; the principal, on the other hand, is a risk-neutral residual claimant and does
not enjoy any private bene￿t. Naturally, the manager could care somewhat about pro￿ts if
he responded to monetary incentives, and the principal could care about poor performance
somewhat if he incurred a utility loss in this case (or if there were, say, bankruptcy costs).
The only thing that truly matters is that the manager cares relatively more than the princi-
pal about the occurrence of poor performance.24 In other words, the key is that the threat
to incumbency rents posed by increased competition has di⁄erent impacts on di⁄erent hier-
archical levels. For instance, if performance pay is more prominent in higher levels, in the
sense that it constitutes a larger fraction of total compensation, then the threat to rents
should matter more at lower levels.25 On the other hand, it seems reasonable to argue that
shareholders care about pro￿ts and are willing to shut down if the business is bad, while
managers have something to lose. This argument works even if managers do respond to
incentives.
The model presented here has left the market game unspeci￿ed. Raith (2003) underscores
the importance of treating market structure as endogenous and analyzing ￿rms￿incentive
provisions within an explicit model of market interaction. It would be interesting to know
how this concern extends to the case of ￿rms￿delegation decisions.26
I have concentrated on the role of competition as a disciplining device in a context in
which managers ￿gure out what to do and do it. Needless to say, there are other channels
through which competition can a⁄ect the choice between centralization and decentralization.
Competition could have other in￿ uences on the trade-o⁄ between loss of control and better
24Nickell et al. (1997) state: ￿For the manager, bankruptcy is a serious threat because of the loss of her job
and its associated (quasi-) rents as well as the threat to her reputation. In the presence of limited liability,
bankruptcy per se poses a much lesser threat to the owners of the company￿ .
25A justi￿cation in the example of a multidivisional ￿rm might be that a manager whose division is shut
down loses everything, whereas the CEO still has many other divisions under his supervision.
26Marin and Verdier (2008a,b) and Ruzzier (2008) make a start along these lines.
23information under delegation. If competition increases the value of the manager￿ s informa-
tion, stronger competition should favor delegation. If, on the other hand, an increase in the
number of ￿rms provides more public information to the principal, she would need to rely
less on the private knowledge of the manager as competition strengthens.27 Competition
may also a⁄ect the trade-o⁄ between adaptation and coordination. A more competitive
environment might require tighter coordination, pushing for centralization, or make quick
adaptation to local conditions more important and foster managerial autonomy.
No doubt, this is ultimately an empirical matter. First, there is the question of whether
competition and delegation are related in the way predicted by the di⁄erent theories. Only
then comes the more di¢ cult matter of distinguishing between di⁄erent observationally-
equivalent explanations. As discussed in the Introduction, the existing empirical evidence is
scarce and inconclusive. Moving forward, this paper suggests that looking for nonlinearities
can be important in future empirical work, and that studies focusing on a simple linear
relation between competition and delegation might be providing a misleading or incomplete
picture.
My results seem to suggest that one needs also to control for ￿nancial position and
performance in regressions of delegation on competition. Marin and Verdier (2008a), for
instance, ￿nd that ￿rms in more pro￿table markets (as measured by ￿rms￿cash ￿ ows) are
more likely to delegate authority when faced with tougher competition. In his case study
of two Norwegian ￿rms, Dill (1958) documents that the more centralized one was the ￿rm
facing more competition and performing poorly. Consistent with the results in Nickell et
al. (2001), Khandwalla (1973) ￿nds that delegation is more likely in more pro￿table ￿rms.
Which way does causality run? Do more pro￿table ￿rms ￿nd it easier to delegate? Or do
more decentralized ￿rms perform better? These are all interesting questions begging for an
answer.
27See Acemoglu et al. (2007).
24Appendix A
Assume there are two players, the principal and the manager, and two periods. The manager
does not respond to monetary incentives, and the principal cannot make any commitments
concerning the manager￿ s tenure ￿i.e., once period 1 is over, she will keep the incumbent
manager if and only if this raises expected pro￿ts.
In period 1, everything is as in the main text. The manager chooses his planning e⁄ort,
and the principal decides how closely to monitor him. Given the outcome of these e⁄orts, a
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where ￿H > ￿M > ￿L: The probabilities of each value are given by the strategy that is
implemented by the organization.
Let R2 denote the expected second-period pro￿t if the ￿rm keeps the incumbent manager
at the end of period 1. R2 is taken to be an increasing function of ￿1: The implicit assumption
here is that there is no strategy selection in period 2. Once implemented, a given strategy
remains in place for the two periods. Assume also that ￿2 = 0 is the ￿rm￿ s certain pro￿t in
period 2 if it shuts down and ￿res the manager.
De￿ne ￿I by R2
￿
￿I￿
= 0: Given that the ￿rm can observe ￿1 once it is realized, the









= ￿I: It is clear that ￿ < b ￿ < ￿: We have
￿ 2 ￿ ￿ [0;￿] : ￿I 6 ￿L < ￿M < ￿H




: ￿L < ￿I 6 ￿M < ￿H




: ￿L < ￿M < ￿I 6 ￿H
and dk (￿) is exactly as in the main text. The analysis then carries on along the same lines.
25Appendix B
In this appendix, I elaborate a bit more on the sources of uncertainty on pro￿ts, and explic-
itly model market games that yield reduced-form pro￿t functions consistent with (2) and
(3). Results are, of course, in accord with Proposition 1. Although I have given it the inter-
pretation of ￿ competition￿ , ￿ is, strictly speaking, a parameter that could represent anything
that has a negative e⁄ect on pro￿tability in the basic model. By making the market game
explicit, we will be able to ascribe a more precise meaning to ￿.
For the purposes of this appendix, assume that the ￿rm runs a constant marginal cost
technology, and must incur a sunk cost before entering the market. Additionally, the man-
ager￿ s actions determine a cost parameter C 2 fCL;CM;CHg; with CL < CM < CH, that
is independent of the level of competition ￿: The strategy that is implemented determines
the probabilities of each cost level as in section 2 ￿for example, if the ￿rm implemented the
conservative strategy, we would have




Pr(C = CM) =
1
3
+ ￿ + ￿; and




Uncertainty on ￿xed cost
We begin by considering the case in which the manager￿ s actions determine a ￿xed cost that
the ￿rm has to incur prior to participating in the market. This implies that the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t
function is additively separable in C and ￿; and can now be expressed as
￿ (C;￿) = R(￿) ￿ C; (8)
where R denotes the pro￿ts from participating in the product market, C is the (realized)




is a parameter measuring the degree of competition in the
26product market.28 I assume again that competition destroys pro￿ts, that is, @R=@￿ < 0:
Notice that there are many market games that yield a reduced-form pro￿t function like
R(￿); consider the following examples, that also allow attaching a more precise meaning to
the idea of ￿more competition￿ . Once the cost parameter is realized at date 3, the principal
takes all pricing and quantity decisions at date 31
2. In all the examples, ￿rm 1 is like the one
considered in the main text.
Example 1 (Hermalin, 1992) Assume that ￿rms compete ￿ la Cournot in a duopoly
with linear demand:
D(p) = A ￿ p:
Firm 1 has known marginal costs ￿. Firm 2 is manager-owned and its known marginal cost
is 1
￿; hence, a higher ￿ implies a more competitive rival ￿one that has lower marginal costs.
The pro￿t of ￿rm 1 is
￿ (C;￿) = R(￿) ￿ C =




It is easily veri￿ed that @R=@￿ < 0; as claimed.
Example 2 Consider the following Dixit-Stiglitz-Spence model of monopolistic compe-
tition with a large number of ￿rms. Firms in the market produce each a di⁄erentiated good
with a marginal cost ￿: The demand function facing ￿rm 1 is approximately:
q1 = A ￿ p
￿1=(1￿￿)
1
where ￿ 2 [0;1] measures the degree of substitutability between the products. If ￿ is close
to one, the goods are nearly perfect substitutes, which implies that the market is highly
competitive. If it is close to zero, products are regarded as very di⁄erent, and hence each
￿rm enjoys a high monopoly power. Pro￿ts of ￿rm 1 are given by
￿ (C;￿) = R(￿) ￿ C = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
￿=(1￿￿) ￿ A ￿ ￿
￿￿=(1￿￿) ￿ C:
28Notice that R is independent of actions, and that C is independent of competition. R could also denote
revenues, and C the total cost of a ￿xed-size project.
27One can check that for ￿ ￿ 1; R(￿) satis￿es @R=@￿ < 0.
Example 3 (Schmidt, 1997) Assume market structure is one of Cournot oligopoly
with an exogenous number of ￿ competitors. Higher ￿ implies more competition in the sense
of an increased number of rivals. Demand is once again linear:
D(p) = A ￿ p:
All ￿rms have the same constant marginal cost technology, with cost parameter ￿: The
pro￿ts of ￿rm 1 are






It is straightforward to verify that @R=@￿ < 0.
Strategies are now to be broadly interpreted as sets of actions that, if implemented, lead


















































The strategy that maximizes expected pro￿ts minimizes expected costs. Let ￿H ￿
￿ (CL;￿); ￿M ￿ ￿ (CM;￿); and ￿L ￿ ￿ (CH;￿): Plugging (8) into (1), ￿(￿) turns out
to be independent of the competition parameter:
￿(￿) = (￿ + ￿)￿M ￿ (￿￿H + ￿￿L) (9)
= (￿ + ￿)(R(￿) ￿ CM) ￿ (￿(R(￿) ￿ CL) + ￿ (R(￿) ￿ CH))
= ￿CL + ￿CH ￿ (￿ + ￿)CM
￿ ￿:
28Given (1), ￿ is strictly positive ￿the ranking of strategies in terms of second-order stochastic
dominance is unchanged: Expected costs are lowest under the conservative strategy, and this
is then the principal￿ s preferred course of action.
The assumption that competition destroys pro￿ts implies that stronger competition
makes poor performance more likely for a given ￿xed cost C. Notice that our previous
partition of ￿ is still valid:



















Now we have that for every ￿ 2 ￿; ￿ (CL;￿) > ￿ (CM;￿) > ￿ (CH;￿) ￿ 0; for all
￿ 2 b ￿; ￿ (CL;￿) > ￿ (CM;￿) ￿ 0 > ￿ (CH;￿); and for every ￿ 2 ￿; ￿ (CL;￿) ￿ 0 >
￿ (CM;￿) > ￿ (CH;￿): As in the main text, we will say that competition is weak whenever
￿ 2 ￿; intermediate, when ￿ 2 b ￿; and intense, when ￿ 2 ￿. I compute the likelihood of
intervention for every level of competition as before:
conservative status quo aggressive
￿ 2 ￿ d
co = 0 d
sq = 0 d
ag = 0
￿ 2 b ￿ b dco = 1
3 ￿ ￿ b dsq = 1
3
b dag = 1
3 + ￿
￿ 2 ￿ d
co
= 2








sq denotes the probability that realized pro￿ts fall short of the threshold ￿I
when competition is weak and the status quo prevails, and that all other probabilities in the
table are de￿ned accordingly. The strategy that minimizes the likelihood of intervention is
the same as in the more general case of Section 3, and the manager will choose in the same
manner if granted autonomy.
To obtain explicit solutions for the planning and monitoring e⁄orts, assume that  j (x) =
x2
2 and that parameter values are such that we have interior solutions.29 Given the assump-
tions, all the expressions for up and um; and the ￿rst-order conditions that I have derived in
29Essentially, ￿ < 1; ￿L < 1; and ￿L < 1:
29the general case continue to be valid when I replace ￿k (￿) with Ek [￿ (C;￿)] = R(￿)￿Ek [C];



























Simple computations show that
c
F > c
F > b c
F;
and
e > b e > e () ￿ > ￿
b e > e > e () ￿ < ￿;
just as in section 3. Notice that, within intervals, e⁄orts do not depend on competition (see,
however, the following subsection).
Uncertainty on marginal costs
Assume, as in the preceding subsection, that the ￿rm runs a constant marginal cost tech-
nology, and must incur a sunk cost f before entering the market, but now f is certain and
the implemented strategy results in a probability distribution on marginal cost C. Once the
marginal cost C is realized and observed by all (including the competitors), the principal
takes all product-market decisions. For the sake of concreteness, let us use the simple setup
of Example 2 (a Cournot duopoly with linear demand).31 The rival￿ s marginal cost is 1
￿
30The superscript F indicates that we are in the case in which the manager￿ s actions a⁄ect the ￿xed cost.
31Notice that ￿ (C;￿) could come from a di⁄erent market game as long as ￿rms are allowed to have di⁄erent
marginal costs.
30(remember that it is manager-owned or entrepreneurial in the sense of Hart, 1983). Pro￿ts
of the ￿rm are given by
￿ (C;￿) =




Notice that this pro￿t function is no longer separable in C and ￿: Expected pro￿ts are
E [￿ (C;￿)] = Pr(C = CL) ￿ ￿ (CL;￿) + Pr(C = CM) ￿ ￿ (CM;￿) + Pr(C = CH) ￿ ￿ (CH;￿):
To simplify notation, let ￿H (￿) ￿ ￿ (CL;￿); ￿M (￿) ￿ ￿ (CM;￿); and ￿L (￿) ￿ ￿ (CH;￿): It
is clear that ￿H (￿) > ￿M (￿) > ￿L (￿); for all ￿; as assumed. Let also ￿k (￿) ￿ Ek [￿ (C;￿)];




















































￿(￿) is de￿ned as in (9), and I continue to assume it is positive. Therefore the principal￿ s
preferred strategy is ￿ conservative￿ . We can partition the support of ￿ in the same way as
we did in Section 2 to ￿nd that the manager￿ s preferred strategy is the same as before for
every level of competition.
Using  j (x) = x2
2 and assuming once again interior solutions, we can plug (10), (11),
and (12) into the ￿rst-order conditions derived in Section 3 to compute the optimal levels of
planning and monitoring e⁄orts (and hence, of autonomy granted to the manager) for each





cM = ￿(￿) = 4
9 [(￿ + ￿)C2
M ￿ (￿C2
L + ￿C2
H) + (A + 1=￿)￿]
eM = 0






















Contrary to the case in which the strategy chosen determined the ￿xed cost, in the
present situation the degree of autonomy granted to the manager depends on the level of
competition within each interval of ￿: Indeed, using the implicit function theorem on the
































Notice that, in all cases, sign(@c=@￿) = sign(@￿=@￿): Computing the right-hand side
derivative, @￿=@￿ = ￿4
9
￿
￿2 < 0: Therefore, autonomy (as measured by 1 ￿ c) increases with
competition within intervals.
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